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SURVEY OF NEW YORK PRACTICE

object of the action when the summons was served, the Supreme Court,
Tompkins County, entered a default judgment after an inquest, the
defendant having failed to appear.4 2 On appeal, the Appellate Division,
Second Department, reversed the lower court's order and vacated the
judgment, holding that the defect in the notice was jurisdictional. 3
The dissent reasoned that since a notice was given pursuant to CPLR
305(b) and the defendant was advised of the assertion of a serious
claim, the court had power to enter the default judgment.4
The Arden holding implies that a defective CPLR 305(b) notice
is equivalent to no notice at all, the defect rendering a court powerless to enter a default judgment. This decision requires one who seeks
the benefits of CPLR 805(b) to comply fully with its provisions, thereby affording the fullest protection to the absent party. The practitioner
can avoid this jurisdictional pitfall by including a statement of the
object of the action when serving a 305(b) notice.
CPLR 308(5): Defendants attempt to evade service of process by
deception held ineffective.
CPLR 308(5) empowers a court to devise extraordinary methods
of service of process when the regular methods are impracticable. 45 Such
impracticability may result when a defendant intentionally evades the
process server. In Kenworthy v. Van Zandt,46 the defendant, by false
assurances of his availability, induced the plaintiff's attorney to delay
service of process for three days. In the interim, the defendant vacated
his New York apartment and established a new domicile in Tennessee.
Upon discovering the ruse, the plaintiff's attorney effected service by
delivering the summons and complaint to the superintendent of the
apartment building where the defendant had resided and by mailing a
[The summons may contain or have attached thereto a notice stating the object
of the action and the relief sought, and, in an action for a sum certain or for a
sum which can by computation be made certain, the sum of money for which
judgment will be taken in case of default.
Note that the statute appears to require a statement of the object of the action in cases
involving liquidated damages as well as in other actions.
42The clerk may enter a default judgment under CPLR 3215 only when the summons and notice were for a liquidated claim. When unliquidated damages are sought,
a plaintiff who has served an object notice may obtain a default judgment by applying
to the court and obtaining an inquest. See 1 WK&M
305.12.
43 40 App. Div. 2d at 895, 837 N.Y.S.2d at 671, citing McDermott v. Hoenig, 32 App.
Div. 2d 838, 302 N.Y.S.2d 280 (2d Dep't 1968) (mem.).
4440 App. Div. 2d at 895, 337 N.Y.S.2d at 671.
45 The court's discretion under CPLR 308(5) is limited only by the requirements of
due process. The method of service devised must be reasonably calculated to give the
defendant notice of the action and an opportunity to be heard. Milliken v. Meyer, 311
U.S. 457 (1940).
46 71 Misc. 2d 950, 337 N.Y.S.2d 481 (N.Y.C. Civ. Ct. N.Y. County 1972).
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copy to the defendant at that address. The defendant's attorney moved
to dismiss the complaint on the ground of improper service. The New
York City Civil Court, New York County, denied the motion and
expressed its abhorrence for the artful devices employed to frustrate
service of process. Relying on Dobkin v. Chapman,4 7 the court concluded that the plaintiff's method of service complied with due process,
but ordered additional service upon the defendant's attorneys, service
48
to be valid nunc pro tunc from the date of the initial service.
Clearly, a defendant should not be allowed to evade service of
process by the deceptive means employed in Kenworthy. The court's
holding comports with New York decisions denying effectiveness to
deceptive avoidance of process.4 9
CPLR 327: Denial of permission to arbitrateon the ground of forum
non conveniens.
0 the petitioner
In Hubbell v. Insurance Co. of North America,5
commenced a proceeding under CPLR 7502(a) for permission to submit to arbitration a controversy between his four infant children and
the respondent insurance company, which was doing business in
Nassau County.r1 The dispute arose out of an automobile collision
with an uninsured Pennsylvania motorist in Pennsylvania. Previously
New York residents, the petitioner and his family had moved to
Pennsylvania prior to the accident.
The Supreme Court, Nassau County, denied the petitioner's application under the doctrine of forum non conveniens, and the Appellate Division, Second Department, unanimously affirmed. Invoking
Silver v. Great American Insurance Co., 2 the Second Department
4721 N.Y.2d 490, 236 N.E2d 451, 289 N.Y.S.2d 161 (1968). The Court of Appeals in
Dobkin established a flexible due process requirement. Due process, the Court stated, may,
in certain circumstances, be satisfied even where there is little probability that the method
of service will give the defendant actual notice of the litigation. "Due process does not
require that defendants derive any advantage from the sedulous avoidance of... measures
[intended to inform them of litigation]." Id. at 504, 236 N.E2d at 459, 289 N.Y.S.2d at 173.
48 71 Misc. 2d at 954, 337 N.Y.S.2d at 484-85. Service which does not comply with
CPLR 308(1), (2), or (4) may be validated by a nunc pro tunc order under CPLR 308(5).
See Totero v. World Tel. Corp., 41 Misc. 2d 594, 245 N.Y.S.2d 870 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County
1963); 7B MCKINNEY'S CPLR 308, commentary at 215 (1972).
49 See Cohen v. Arista Truck Renting Corp., 70 Misc. 2d 729, 335 N.Y.S.2d 30 (Sup.
Ct. Nassau County 1972) (defendant in automobile accident case voluntarily gave plaintiff
wrong address); Schenkman v. Schenkman, 206 Misc. 660, 136 N.Y.S.2d 405 (Sup. Ct. Kings
County), aff'd mem., 284 App. Div. 1068, 137 N.Y.S.2d 628 (2d Dep't 1954) (defendant
in divorce action misrepresented his identity and returned process papers).
50 40 App. Div. 2d 696, 336 N.Y.S.2d 310 (2d Dep't 1972) (mem.).
51 Since the respondent was doing business in Nassau County, an application was
properly brought there under CPLR 7502(e).
5229 N.Y.2d 356, 278 N.E.2d 619, 328 N.Y.S.2d 398 (1972), noted in 46 ST. JOHN'S L.
Rv.588 (1972).

